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FOREWORD 
 THE PRACTICES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
JENS MEIERHENRICH* 
The authors in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems explore the 
everyday lives of international law. More specifically, the authors theorize and 
investigate select “practices” of the International Criminal Court (ICC), by 
which I mean recurrent and meaningful work activities—social or material—
that are performed in a regularized fashion and that have a bearing, whether 
large or small, on the operation of the ICC. By conceiving the ICC as a bundle 
of practices rather than as a unitary actor whose performance is primarily 
governed by politics, I seek to re-direct the existing literature on the much 
debated international organization, which has largely failed to engage, both 
theoretically and empirically, with the inner workings of the sizable 
bureaucracy based in The Hague—and the many organizational, cultural, and 
other cleavages that run through it and that have had a more than random 
institutional effect on international adjudication. In this foreword I give a brief 
account of the theoretical foundations on which this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems rests, then provide an overview of the empirical 
investigations. I close by briefly sketching avenues for further research.1 
I 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The empirical investigations that form the core of this issue all revolve 
around what has become known, in the last few decades, as practice theory. 
Although the many contending perspectives on the nature and logic of practices 
hardly combine into one unified theory, the term has stuck ever since it first 
emerged in the late 1970s, and I will use it here. Although space constraints 
disallow a comprehensive discussion of the key tenets of practice-oriented 
reasoning in the humanities and social sciences—something that I attempt in 
my framework article—it bears emphasizing at least very briefly what this 
perspective entails. Generally speaking, a practice-oriented approach (of which 
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 1.  I return to these matters in considerably more depth in my substantive contribution to this 
issue. Jens Meierhenrich, The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 1. 
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many alternative ones exist) sidesteps agents or structures as principal 
determinants of social action, including legal action, and prioritizes a processual 
view. As one scholar usefully put it, theories of practice 
foreground the importance of activity, performance, and work in the creation of all 
aspects of social life. Practice approaches are fundamentally processual and tend to 
see the world as an ongoing routinized and recurrent accomplishment. This applies 
even to the most durable aspects of social life—what scholars call social structures. 
Family, authority, institutions, and organizations are all kept in existence through the 
recurrent performance of material activities, and to a large extent they only exist as 
long as those activities are performed.
2
 
What this means for the study of international law, where practice theory 
has made only modest inroads, is a shift from states, international courts, or 
other unitary actors to practices as the principal unit of analysis. Similarly, 
practice theorists turn to closely observed patterns of recurrent behavior for 
analytical insight about international legal phenomena before invoking the 
causal or constitutive role of structures, be they ideas or the distribution of 
power in the international system. What all perspectives from practice theory 
have in common is a deep interest in revealing the social meaning(s) of life. By 
singling out the everyday lives of the social phenomena with which they are 
concerned, practice theorists aim to integrate objective (think rationalism) and 
subjective (think constructivism) ways of seeing the world. Insights from 
practice theory have not yet been applied to the ICC, an oversight that 
occasioned the theoretical orientation of this issue of Law and Contemporary 
Problems. The collective project is geared toward exploring the promise—and 
limits—of rendering the ICC in practice terms, that is, in terms that favor 
neither methodological individualism nor methodological structuralism but that 
incorporate insights from both in the study of international law. I hasten to add 
that the application of practice theory attempted herein is exploratory and that 
considerably more analytical reflection is required to figure out the most 
suitable “theory–method package,” a term coined by Davide Nicolini, for the 
study of practices in international law.3 
II 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
I asked each of the contributors to the issue to focus their attention on one 
distinctive set of practices—to identify it, to demarcate its conceptual 
boundaries, and to analyze it by relating theory to empirical data and vice versa. 
Given the very abstract nature of practice theory, and the substantial amount of 
translational work that each of these tasks consequently required, some articles 
are more explicitly oriented toward the theoretical framework that I advance in 
the lead article than others. What is more, some of the empirical investigations 
are more descriptive than analytical and thus are not yet perfect examples of 
 
 2.  DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 3 
(2013). 
 3.  NICOLINI, supra note 2, at 213–42. 
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the kinds of analytic narratives about practices of international law that the 
larger project from which this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is 
culled, was designed to ultimately produce.4 
These outcomes are neither problematic nor altogether surprising. They are 
symptoms of the continuing divide—which has manifested itself ontologically, 
epistemologically, and methodologically—between scholars and practitioners of 
international law, neither group of which has shown any abiding interest in 
grasping how the other sees the world of international law, and what that other 
may have to offer the first’s interpretation. To the detriment of knowledge 
production in the study of international law, the vast majority of theoretically 
sophisticated international legal scholars have but a fleeting understanding of 
the reality of international law. This tendency is even more pronounced when it 
comes to International Relations (IR) scholars of international law. Conversely, 
the number of international legal practitioners with more than a perfunctory 
grasp of leading international legal scholarship, whether produced by 
International Law (IL) or IR scholars, is disconcertingly small. To help remedy 
these unfortunate facts of international legal life, and to alert observers to the 
more mundane—but nevertheless highly significant—aspects of international 
criminal law, I invited established and emerging scholars and practitioners to 
home in on the social lives of international adjudication at the ICC. I am 
grateful to all of my contributors for their willingness to venture into what for 
all of them was unknown theoretical territory, especially in instances where 
their high-level international legal practice made it exceedingly difficult to find 
the cognitive space necessary for the kind of analytical reflexivity that I pushed 
them to adopt. 
All of the articles in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems are best 
viewed as works in progress, as initial, pioneering efforts at thinking the ICC 
anew, that is, from a novel analytical perspective and with particular reference 
to the daily grind of investigating, prosecuting, defending, adjudicating, and 
administering those who stand accused of having perpetrated the most serious 
of international crimes. Because no blueprint existed after which the authors 
could have modeled the practice-oriented analyses that I commissioned, they all 
approached this analytical challenge differently, and typically in accordance 
with their respective vocational backgrounds. The result is a set of very diverse 
articles. Although some of the authors make more of practice theory than 
others, all of the contributions are worthwhile in that they illuminate previously 
neglected aspects of the ICC as an international organization, from the 
intricacies of administration to the dynamics of prosecution to the limits of 
representation to the biases of documentation. 
 
 4.  Note that my conception of analytic narratives departs rather fundamentally from the narrow 
definition pioneered by Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry 
R. Weingast in their coauthored volume ANALYTIC NARRATIVES (1998). Mine is an effort to claim the 
term for the interpretative study of international law so as to advance both the anthropology of 
international law and the sociology of international law.  
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With this in mind, let me provide an overview of what is to come. The nine 
articles that comprise this symposium are dedicated not only to analyzing 
bureaucratic practices, but also to making sense of what scholars in the political 
science subfield of IR recently theorized as international practices. When read in 
conjunction, they afford a partial view of the web of legal significance that 
several thousand men and women from around the world have spun in the first 
decade of the ICC’s existence, whether based in The Hague or elsewhere. They 
offer tentative conclusions about an uncertain international organization, each 
occupying a unique vantage point from which to shed light on the institutional 
development of the ICC. 
In The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, I lay the 
theoretical foundations for a sustained practice turn in the study of 
international law in general, and in the study of the ICC, in particular.5 More 
specifically, I introduce key attributes regularly associated with practice-based 
reasoning in the humanities and social sciences and offer an account of what 
practices are and how they work. I introduce more theoretical complexity by 
considering noteworthy advances in classic and contemporary theory to 
showcase the considerably diverse intellectual oeuvre that is available for 
adoption and reconfiguration by entrepreneurial IL and IR scholars intrigued 
to think more theoretically about the many visible—and hidden—practices that 
constitute international law, at the ICC and elsewhere. The article closes with 
methodological guidelines for the study of practices in international law more 
generally. 
In the first substantive article, Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the 
Kampala Compromise for the International Criminal Court, Noah Weisbord, an 
associate professor of law at Florida International University, reflects on what 
he considers an important international practice, namely the role of sincerity in 
the difficult negotiations over the criminalization of aggression in the twelve 
years between the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court in 1998 and the conclusion of the so-called Kampala Compromise of 
2010.6 Drawing on Erving Goffman and other social theorists, Weisbord 
theorizes sincerity as communicative truthfulness about a subjective internal 
mental state. Based on his participant observation over several years of 
meetings of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(SWGCA), Weisbord argues and demonstrates convincingly that sincere 
bargaining gradually but surely became the dominant social practice in the 
aggression negotiations. In his article, he explains sincerity’s rise thus: 
[S]incerity emerged as an effective international practice in the aggression 
negotiations because it engendered trust and all of its benefits. Gamesmanship was 
discouraged within the culture of the SWGCA and it became increasingly risky and 
costly to be duplicitous. Diplomats were well attuned to each other’s strategic interests 
and were keen observers of each other’s verbal and nonverbal cues, making it difficult 
 
 5.  Meierhenrich, supra note 1. 
 6.  Noah Weisbord, Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the Kampala Compromise for the 
International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 85. 
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to mislead others. In these protracted negotiations, it would have been exhausting to 
maintain a facade and the benefits were uncertain.7 
Next, Klaus Rackwitz and Philipp Ambach turn from international politics 
to bureaucratic politics. In their article A Model of International Judicial 
Administration? The Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International 
Criminal Court, the two longstanding ICC practitioners (one of whom recently 
left the ICC for Eurojust, where he is the administrative director) provide an 
internal perspective on the logic of administration at the ICC.8 Given 
Rackwitz’s decade-long service in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), where he 
was the senior administrative manager between 2003 and 2011, and Ambach’s 
several years of service as the special assistant to the president of the ICC, the 
authors write from a position of deep immersion in the administration of 
international adjudication. Although their analysis is more conventional than 
some of the others included in the issue, and largely devoid of theoretical 
reflection, the empirical depth of their contribution goes a long way toward 
advancing our knowledge of the making of the ICC bureaucracy, flaws and all. 
For as Rackwitz and Ambach write, 
The Court’s legal and institutional framework provides the senior managers of the 
institution with clear guidance as regards the general pillars and foundational 
arrangements. However, many areas that were left unregulated at the outset have 
required managerial practice over time to establish appropriate informal structures, 
procedures, and modi operandi on a variety of different topics, on both an intra- and 
interorgan level. Further, the Rome Statute and other legal texts issued by the 
Assembly defining the Court’s institutional framework contain some ambiguous 
provisions, which has left the Court with the daunting task of finding the practically 
achievable arrangements that best approximate optimal arrangements within the 
confines of the Rome Statute system.
9 
It is too soon to ascertain the consequences for the adjudication of international 
crimes of these administrative challenges, but the article makes clear that the 
question of how the ICC is run—and how effectively—is far from a trivial 
matter of international law and international politics. 
In his article Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal 
Court, Alex Whiting, the prosecution coordinator and former investigations 
coordinator of the OTP, examines the work and efforts, coordinated and 
otherwise, that during the last decade have shaped the investigation of 
international crimes.10 Whiting, who is also professor of practice at Harvard 
Law School, argues that recurring practices along the lines theorized in my 
framework article have been sparse inside the OTP. He finds that “ICC 
investigations are generally reactive, highly dynamic, and unpredictable.”11 
 
 7.  Id. at 100. 
 8.  Philipp Ambach & Klaus U. Rackwitz, A Model of International Judicial Administration? The 
Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
nos. 3–4, 2013 at 119. 
 9.  Id. at 160. 
 10.  Alex Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 163. 
 11.  Id.  
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Whiting explains why this is so and illustrates what he diagnoses as a 
problematic tension between formal legal requirements and informal 
investigative practices with empirical evidence drawn from a number of 
different OTP investigations, notably the Libya situation. 
Karim Khan has been a longstanding practitioner of international criminal 
law, whose career, like Whiting’s, began at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). A barrister at Temple Garden Chambers, 
London, Khan has been on the list of defence counsel at virtually all of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals established after the end of the Cold 
War. He served at the ICC and ICTY as well as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon. He is best known for representing Charles Taylor, the former 
president of Liberia, before the SCSL, and several defendants who stand 
accused at the ICC of international crimes related to the collective violence that 
tore through parts of Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections 
there. In their article Defensive Practices: Representing Clients Before the 
International Criminal Court, Khan and Anand Shah, a case manager at Temple 
Garden Chambers, explain why, and how, the institutional design of the ICC 
has given rise to particular forms of conduct by attorneys representing accused 
individuals.12 They do so by analyzing defensive practices related to two 
important aspects of international criminal procedure, namely the disclosure 
process and the so-called confirmation of charges at the ICC. By explicating the 
nature and evolution of defensive ways of doing things, as exemplified by their 
own experience in some of the ongoing Darfur and Kenya proceedings, Khan 
and Shah provide an unique and extended glimpse into the everyday life of 
representing clients at the ICC, highlighting what we might call the structured 
contingency of international representation. 
Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen with Representational Practices at the 
International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract 
Victimhood offer a critical account of what one might call victim fetishism in the 
international community.13 Kendall, of Leiden University, and Nouwen, of the 
University of Cambridge, challenge the triumphalist, victim-centered narrative 
that portrays the ICC as a forum for greater participation by, and an engine for 
enhanced representation of, those whose lives have been affected by the large-
scale violence adjudicated in The Hague. Kendall and Nouwen show that the 
representational practices of the first permanent international criminal court 
have thus far produced very different and largely disappointing outcomes. As 
they write, 
 
 12.  Karim A. A. Khan & Anand A. Shah, Defensive Practices: Representing Clients Before the 
International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 191. 
 13.  Sara Kendall & Sarah Nouwen, Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: 
The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 
235. 
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in the practices of the ICC—which in this context involves not merely the court, but 
also the epistemic community surrounding it—victims are both overdetermined and 
less represented than the claims suggest. They are overdetermined in that all victims 
are amalgamated into an abstract entity, “The Victims,” which serves as a rhetorical 
justification and rationalization of the project of international criminal law. 
Meanwhile, as a result of juridification, very few individuals are actually personally 
represented in legal proceedings. This gap between the discourse surrounding victim 
representation and what transpires in the court’s work—namely between the 
presentation of “The Victims” as the raison d’être of international criminal law and 
the very limited role of victims in international criminal proceedings—coincides with a 
gap between the victim as an abstraction and as an actual victim of mass atrocity.
14
 
The final three articles zoom out analytically from the ICC’s bureaucratic 
practices (as Kendall and Nouwen also partially do) to shed light on a number 
of broader activities, all of them international in nature. Joseph Hoover, 
lecturer in International Politics at City University, London, and formerly of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, asks how international 
courts, notably the ICC, are constituted in the international system as actors 
with the capacity to assign blame, that is, legal responsibility for international 
crimes. In his article, entitled Moral Practices: Assigning Responsibility in the 
International Criminal Court, Hoover attempts an answer by theorizing moral 
responsibility as a social practice, with particular reference to John Dewey’s 
pragmatist philosophy.15 Doing so, he claims, makes it possible to bring politics 
into the discussion of morality. To demonstrate the point, Hoover offers up a 
discussion of the ICC’s intervention in Uganda, arguing that the prosecution of 
international crimes there shows “that there are serious unintended 
consequences of the court’s pursuit of its moral ends.”16 
Frédéric Mégret, associate professor of law and Canada Research Chair in 
the Law of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism at McGill University, pushes in a 
similar direction as Hoover. He, too, wants to abstract from what he calls the 
“strictly forensic goals” of international criminal law, that is, from the 
interrelated tasks of “investigating crimes, prosecuting the accused, and 
guaranteeing a fair trial.”17 More interested in international practices than 
bureaucratic practices, Mégret, in his article Practices of Stigmatization, relates 
ideas about stigma developed by the sociologist Emile Durkheim to select 
aspects of practice theory in an effort to gain a better lens onto the goals and 
impact of international criminal justice.18 In this context, he purports that 
stigma serves as a broad, implicit orientation of the practices of actors in the criminal-
justice system, one that in fact makes better sense of what the ICC is involved in. 
Stigmatization practices, then, describe the totality of practices engaged in by various 
actors of international criminal justice that aim to produce, channel, or deflect stigma. 
Further, I will argue that the accumulation of these practices, both deliberate and 
 
 14.  Id. at 261–62. 
 15.  Joseph Hoover, Moral Practices: Assigning Responsibility in the International Criminal Court, 
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 263. 
 16.  Id. at 284. 
 17.  Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 
287, 287. 
 18.  Id. 
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unarticulated or subconscious, effectively helps the ICC become the powerful vehicle 
for stigmatization and international social regeneration that it is and thus provides a 
horizon within which the meaning of the court in international relations and law can 
be better understood.
19 
In pursuit of this argument, Mégret unpacks the logic of stigmatization 
theoretically, and illustrates its operation empirically with reference to ongoing 
ICC activities. 
Wouter Werner, a professor of international law at the University of 
Amsterdam, completes the lineup with an interesting analysis of visual 
depictions of the ICC. In his article “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Imagine 
What it All Means”: Documentary Practices and the International Criminal 
Court, he investigates a rarely examined social activity with an immediate 
bearing on our perception of international criminal law in general and of the 
ICC in particular—documentary portrayals.20 The analytical focus on these 
journalistic or educational practices are indispensable, according to Werner, 
“because documentaries have turned into a powerful set of practices through 
which the court is imagined and narrated, ultimately influencing opinions about 
the court’s work.”21 Werner’s close reading of Carte Blanche, a 2011 
documentary about the trial at the ICC of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the 
former vice president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, together with 
his shorter interpretations of three other documentaries on the ICC—The 
Reckoning, The Court, and Kony 2012—usefully problematizes the 
manufacturing of knowledge about the ICC and the atrocities that it was 
created to adjudicate. By theorizing ICC-themed documentaries from the 
vantage point of practice theory, Werner brings the humanities to the study of 
international law in a manner that forces us to reconsider what we know about 
the first permanent international criminal court, and how we have come to 
know it. 
All of the aforementioned articles, albeit diverse in scope, depth, and 
theoretical sophistication, contribute to pushing the study of international law 
in a new direction. The explicit and theoretical foregrounding of recurrent and 
meaningful work activities—social or material—related to international 
adjudication at the ICC has the potential of bridging the intellectual gulf 
between scholars and practitioners of international criminal law, neither group 
of which has fared particularly well in presenting accounts of the ICC that are 
theoretically aware as well as empirically attuned. 
Any scholar or practitioner hoping to truly understand the ICC as the 
leaving and breathing organism of international life that it is would do well to 
think of international criminal law not only in terms politics, as IR scholars have 
been wont to do ever since the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo were imposed by the victorious Allies on the aggressor countries of 
 
 19.  Id. at 295. 
 20.  Wouter G. Werner, “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Imagine What it All Means”: Documentary 
Practices and the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 319.  
 21.  Id. at 322. 
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World War II, or in terms of procedure, as doctrinally-oriented IL scholars are 
in the habit of doing, but also in terms of practices. 
III 
ANALYTICAL EXTENSIONS 
The next iteration of this project is an enhanced edited volume that consists 
of deepened and broadened versions of the articles collected here as well as 
analyses of ICC-related practices not featured, due to space and other 
constraints, in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. But the study of 
practices promises to illuminate other areas of international law as well. This 
issue’s focus on the ICC was motivated by my own research agenda, and the 
increasing significance in the international system of the permanent 
international court, but there is no reason why a practice-oriented approach 
could not also illuminate, say, the workings of the Dispute Settlement Body of 
the World Trade Organization, the goings-on in the International Law 
Commission, the making of customary international law in a specified area, or 
the functioning of the international law department in a given ministry of 
foreign affairs, to name but a few of the countless research projects that are 
conceivable and that could help bridge the gap between the theory and practice 
of international law. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal recently declared the 
integration of theoretical and applied knowledge “a core agenda for the next 
generation of IL/IR scholarship.”22 As they put it, “This agenda takes what 
might be called a ‘soft external’ perspective: it accepts that internal 
understandings of law, embodied in legal practices, are valuable on their own 
terms, but argues that international understandings must be supplemented by 
external perspectives.”23 This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems comes 
from a similar analytical place. Mere descriptions of ICC developments are 
considerably less useful than analytical treatments of empirical phenomena 
informed by an external theoretical perspective. 
The external perspective that my contributors and I have brought to bear is 
that of practice theory. The advantage of trying to make this body of diverse 
(and rather unwieldy) theoretical insights usable for the study of international 
law lies in its ability to combine easily with mechanism-based explanations in 
the social sciences, which is to say, theoretical sophistication is attainable 
without having to reduce empirical complexity in the name of parsimony, as is 
usually required when it comes to applying the high level of generality of 
mainstream IR theory to international legal phenomena. With a little bit of 
luck, the select practices—bureaucratic and international—that the contributors 
to this issue on the ICC have tackled, for the first time, illustrate the 
 
 22.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the Next 
Generation of IL/IR Scholars, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 33, 49 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack 
eds., 2013) 
 23.  Id. 
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explanatory potential that is associated with taking seriously the everyday life 
of international law. The attempt to do so is part of an ongoing effort to come 
to terms with the microdynamics of international law, an endeavor that 
requires, or so I propose, the integration of insights from rationalism and 
doctrinalism and interpretivism. 
 
